A harm based solution to the non-identity problem

Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2:427-444 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Many of us agree that we ought not to wrong future people, but there remains disagreement about which of our actions can wrong them. Can we wrong individuals whose lives are worth living by taking actions that result in their very existence? The problem of justifying an answer to this question has come to be known as the non-identity problem.[1] While the literature contains an array of strategies for solving the problem,[2] in this paper I will take what I call the harm-based approach, and I will defend an account of harming—which I call the existence account of harming—that can vindicate this approach. Roughly put, the harm-based approach holds that, by acting in ways that result in the existence of individuals whose lives are worth living, we can harm and thereby wrong those individuals. An initially plausible way to try to justify this approach is to endorse the non-comparative account of harming, which holds that an event harms an individual just in case it causes her to be in a bad state, such that the state’s badness does not derive from a comparison between that state and some alternative state that the individual would or could have been in. However, many philosophers argue that the non-comparative account of harming is inadequate,[3] and one might be tempted to infer from this that any harm-based approach to the non-identity problem will fail. My proposal, which I call the existence account of harming, will show that this inference is faulty: we can vindicate the harm-based approach without relying on the non-comparative account of harming.

Similar books and articles

Have We Solved the Non-Identity Problem?Fiona Woollard - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):677-690.
Our Responsibility to the Non-existent.Chelsea Haramia - 2013 - Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1):249-256.
The exploitation solution to the Non-Identity Problem.Hallie Liberto - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):73-88.
Does the Non-Identity Problem Block a Class of Arguments Against Cloning?Richard Greene - 2004 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 18 (1):95-101.
Personal identity, fission and time travel.John Wright - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):129-142.
Identity, harm, and the ethics of reproductive technology.Janet Malek - 2006 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (1):83 – 95.
Mortal harm.Steven Luper - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):239–251.


Added to PP

819 (#15,769)

6 months
127 (#22,339)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Molly Gardner
University of Florida

Citations of this work

A Simple Analysis of Harm.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9:509-536.
Harm: Omission, Preemption, Freedom.Nathan Hanna - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):251-73.
Causal Accounts of Harming.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):420-445.
On the Strength of the Reason Against Harming.Molly Gardner - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (1):73-87.
Beneficence and procreation.Molly Gardner - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):321-336.

View all 28 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Harm to Others.Joel Feinberg - 1987 - Oxford University Press USA.
Death.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Noûs 4 (1):73-80.
The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People.David Boonin - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

View all 24 references / Add more references