Animal Punishment and the Conditions of Responsibility

Philosophical Papers 49 (1):69-105 (2020)
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Abstract

In this essay I distinguish categories of animals by their mental capacities. I then discuss whether punishment can be appropriate for animals of each category, and if so what form punishment may appropriately take for animals of each category. The aim is to illuminate each type of punishment through comparison and contrast with the others. This both forestalls the overintellectualization of punishment which arises from viewing humans as the only paradigm case and forestalls the underintellectualization of human punishment which results from making no essential reference, in an account of human punishment, to the human capacity for specifically critical reasoning.

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Jon Garthoff
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Citations of this work

Punitive intent.Nathan Hanna - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):655 - 669.

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References found in this work

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon (ed.) - 1998 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.

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