A posteriori necessity in singular causation and the Humean argument

Dialectica 57 (1):41–55 (2003)
Abstract
The absence of a necessary connection in singular causation is a key step in the Humean argument against any form of necessity in causation. I argue that Hume's defence of this step is unsuccessful, and that the step could be skipped, accepting the possibility of necessary a posteriori truths. Still this does not suffice to guarantee a necessary connection in singular causation. Necessary a posteriori truths should be backed by necessary a priori truths. Thus, a main object of this paper is to argue that an a priori philosophical concept of causality involves a necessary connection between its terms
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2003.tb00254.x
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References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1738 - Oxford University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.

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Citations of this work BETA
Tropes for Causation.M. J. Garcia-Encinas - 2009 - Metaphysica 10 (2):157-174.

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