Conhecimento e significação prática - uma hipótese aristotélica

Hypnos. Revista Do Centro de Estudos da Antiguidade 31:219-233 (2013)
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the peculiarity of what Aristotle named practical wisdom or practical knowledge. Pivot to our analysis is the first thesis of the Nicomachean Ethics, where the philosopher appears to state a fallacy when he argues that, given that all actions aim at some good, good is that which every action aims to. We argue that the inference is non-fallacious because of the peculiarity of the practical domain, which manifests itself in the identity of the good and the end. This identity is in the origin of what we would call, as an hypothesis, practical significance.



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