Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth?

Manuscrito 40 (2):39-70 (2017)

Abstract
ABSTRACT John MacFarlane’s truth relativism makes use of two notions of propositional truth: a monadic assessment sensitive one taken to be our ordinary truth notion, and a non-monadic one that is meant to account for the assessment sensitivity of the former notion. Some authors contend that any theory introducing a technical non-monadic truth notion has to make sense of it by defining or characterizing it in terms of ordinary monadic truth. First, I give some reasons why the relativist should not discard this approach to make sense of the notion of truth relative to a context of assessment. Second, I argue that an illuminating characterization of this notion must provide an answer to a dilemma Paul Boghossian poses to the relativist. Third, I single out the characterization that can answer this dilemma. Finally, I contend that the relativist still needs to show that this solution works for each case subject to a relativist treatment.
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1590/0100-6045.2017.v40n2.mg
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References found in this work BETA

Relativism and Disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
Future Contingents and Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.
Making Sense of Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.
Faultless Disagreement.Max Kölbel - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):53-73.
The Evidence for Relativism.Max Kölbel - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):375-395.

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