Ratio 12 (1):14-33 (1999)
Davidson argues that mental properties are causally relevant properties. I argue that Davidson cannot appeal to ceteris paribus causal laws to ensure that these properties are causally relevant, if he wishes to retain his argument for anomalous monism. Second, I argue that the appeal to supervenience cannot, by itself, give us an account of the causal relevancy of mental properties. I argue that, while mental properties may indeed 'make a difference' to the causally efficacious properties of events, this is not sufficient to show that mental properties are causally relevant
|Keywords||Causation Counterfactual Epistemology Mental Monism Davidson, D|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Defending Non-Epiphenomenal Event Dualism.Brian J. Garrett - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):393-412.
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