Mind and Language 8 (1):49-71 (1993)

Alan Garnham
University of Sussex
This paper argues against Oaksford and Chater's claim that logicist cognitive science is not possible. It suggests that there arguments against logicist cognitive science are too closely tied to the account of Pylyshyn and of Fodor, and that the correct way of thinking about logicist cognitive science is in a mental models framework.
Keywords Cognitive Science  Language  Logicism  Chater, N  Oaksford, M
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1993.tb00270.x
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References found in this work BETA

Minds, Brains, and Programs.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.

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Mental Models and the Tractability of Everyday Reasoning.Mike Oaksford - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):360-361.
Probabilistic Effects in Data Selection.Mike Oaksford, Nick Chater & Becki Grainger - 1999 - Thinking and Reasoning 5 (3):193 – 243.

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