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Is logicist cognitive science possible?
Mind and Language 8 (1):49-71 (1993)
Abstract
This paper argues against Oaksford and Chater's claim that logicist cognitive science is not possible. It suggests that there arguments against logicist cognitive science are too closely tied to the account of Pylyshyn and of Fodor, and that the correct way of thinking about logicist cognitive science is in a mental models framework.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):608-631.
From simple associations to systematic reasoning: A connectionist representation of rules, variables, and dynamic binding using temporal synchrony.Lokendra Shastri & Venkat Ajjanagadde - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):417-51.
Mental models and the tractability of everyday reasoning.Mike Oaksford - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):360-361.
Probabilistic effects in data selection.Mike Oaksford, Nick Chater & Becki Grainger - 1999 - Thinking and Reasoning 5 (3):193 – 243.
The Case for Psychologism in Default and Inheritance Reasoning.Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Renée Elio - 2005 - Synthese 146 (1-2):7-35.
References found in this work
Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1988 - Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.
On language and connectionism: Analysis of a parallel distributed processing model of language acquisition.Steven Pinker & Alan Prince - 1988 - Cognition 28 (1-2):73-193.
Understanding Computers and Cognition: A New Foundation for Design.Terry Winograd & Fernando Flores - 1987 - Addison-Wesley.
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