Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin (
2002)
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Abstract
In this dissertation, I argue that John Stuart Mill does not defend a classical liberal, Lockean idea of liberty as freedom from coercion, especially governmental coercion. Rather, I argue that Mill has something much more radical in mind: for Mill, liberty requires freedom from the much broader idea of "the moral coercion of public opinion." ;Mill's so-called "harm principle," which is at the root of his defense of liberty, is often common-sensically interpreted according to what I term the political interpretation of the harm principle. On the political interpretation the harm principle is intended to restrict the use of coercion, especially governmental coercion. On the political interpretation the harm principle is intended to draw a line between those areas of life that are subject to moral sanctions, and those that are subject to the law. All the mechanisms of moral suasion, including even boycotting, excommunication and shunning, are available to the moral realm; but when one's actions harm another, they become subject to legal punishment. ;In contrast to the political interpretation, I urge an interpretation I call the social interpretation of the harm principle. According to the social interpretation, the harm principle is intended to restrict expressions of disapproval, such as boycotting or blacklisting. According to the social interpretation, the harm principle rules out any such notion as private morality/immorality: for something to be considered immoral, it must harm others