Mice in mirrored mazes and the mind

Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):123-34 (1993)
Abstract
The computational theory of cognition (CTC) holds that the mind is akin to computer software. This article aims to show that CTC is incorrect because it is not able to distinguish the ability to solve a maze from the ability to solve its mirror image. CTC cannot do so because it only individuates brain states up to isomorphism. It is shown that a finer individuation that would distinguish left-handed from right-handed abilities is not compatible with CTC. The view is explored that CTC correctly individuates in an autonomous domain of the mental, leaving discrimination between left and right to some non-cognitive component of psychology such as physiology. I object by showing that the individuation provided by CTC does not properly describe in any domain. An embodied computational taxonomy, rather than software alone, is required for an adequate science of the mind
Keywords Cognition  Computer  Epistemology  Mind  Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515089308573083
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,208
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Readings in Philosophy of Psychology.Ned Block (ed.) - 1980 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

1 ( #885,999 of 2,172,801 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #324,903 of 2,172,801 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums