Metaphilosophy 43 (1-2):147-164 (2012)

Authors
M. J. Garcia-Encinas
University of Granada
Abstract
This article argues for two related theses. First, it defends a general thesis: any kind of necessity, including metaphysical necessity, can only be known a priori. Second, however, it also argues that the sort of a priori involved in modal metaphysical knowledge is not related to imagination or any sort of so-called epistemic possibility. Imagination is neither a proof of possibility nor a limit to necessity. Rather, modal metaphysical knowledge is built on intuition of philosophical categories and the structures they form
Keywords metaphysical necessity  a priori  categories  intuition
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2012.01734.x
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.Thomas Reid - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Mind, Language, and Reality.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Cambridge University Press.

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