Authors
Manuel García-Carpintero
Universitat de Barcelona
Abstract
Several philosophers advance substantive theories of propositions, to deal with several issues they raise in connection with a concern with a long pedigree in philosophy, the problem of the unity of propositions. The qualification ‘substantive’ is meant to contrast with ‘minimal’ or ‘deflationary’ – roughly, views that reject that propositions have a hidden nature, worth investigating. Substantive views appear to create spurious problems by characterizing propositions in ways that make them unfit to perform their theoretical jobs. I will present in this light some critical points against Hanks’ (2015, 2019) act-theoretic view, and Recanati’s (2019) recent elaboration of Hanks’ notion of cancellation. Both Hanks and Recanati, I’ll argue, rely on problematic conceptions of fiction and pretense.
Keywords propositions  pretense  representational content  representational vehicles
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References found in this work BETA

New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Propositional Content.Peter Hanks - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
Truth in Fiction.David K. Postscripts to Lewis - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):37--46.
What is Meaning?Scott Soames - 2010 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Act‐Type Theories of Propositions.Thomas Hodgson - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (11).

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