Abstract
David Owen begins his contribution by setting out very clearly how my interpretation of Hume’s distinction between simple and complex perceptions helps to resolve some puzzles about apparent counterexamples to the two most fundamental principles of Hume’s cognitive psychology: the Copy Principle and the Separability Principle. His primary object of criticism is my interpretation of Hume’s famous conclusion that inductive inferences are “not determin’d by reason”. I am as grateful for Owen’s criticisms concerning my treatment of induction as I am for his approval of my treatment of the simple/complex distinction, because his criticisms provide me with an opportunity to modify my earlier interpretation of Hume’s famous conclusion in a way that I hope will resolve the issue to everyone’s—including Owen’s—satisfaction. I will first explain Owen’s own interpretation and the most serious objection to which it is subject. I will then present my modified interpretation and explain how it avoids the objection while accommodating Owen’s central insight. I will conclude by responding to Owen’s two specific criticisms of the earlier version of my interpretation.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
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