Philosophical Papers 34 (2):189-208 (2005)
Abstract Non-reductive physicalism is currently the most widely held metaphysic of mind. My aim in this essay is to show that supervenience physicalism?perhaps the most common form of non-reductive physicalism?is not a defensible position. I argue that, in order for any supervenience thesis to ground a legitimate form of physicalism, it must yield the right sort of determination relation between physical and non-physical properties. Then I argue that non-reductionism leaves one without any explanation for the laws that are implied by supervenience theses that deliver this determination relation
|Keywords||Determination Explanation Metaphysics Physicalism Supervenience|
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The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation.Ernest Nagel - 1961 - Harcourt, Brace & World.
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