Supervenience physicalism: Meeting the demands of determination and explanation

Philosophical Papers 34 (2):189-208 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Abstract Non-reductive physicalism is currently the most widely held metaphysic of mind. My aim in this essay is to show that supervenience physicalism?perhaps the most common form of non-reductive physicalism?is not a defensible position. I argue that, in order for any supervenience thesis to ground a legitimate form of physicalism, it must yield the right sort of determination relation between physical and non-physical properties. Then I argue that non-reductionism leaves one without any explanation for the laws that are implied by supervenience theses that deliver this determination relation

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Supervenience and Reductive Physicalism.Erhan Demircioglu - 2011 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (1):25-35.
The Supervenience Argument against Non‐Reductive Physicalism.Andrew Russo - 2011-09-16 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 314–317.
Can physicalism be non-reductive?Andrew Melnyk - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1281-1296.
Physicalism without supervenience.Lei Zhong - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1529-1544.
Physicalism and Qualia.Thomas Allen Gardner - 2002 - Dissertation, Purdue University
Type Physicalism and Causal Exclusion.Joseph A. Baltimore - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:405-418.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
164 (#121,142)

6 months
18 (#152,517)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Physicalism without supervenience.Lei Zhong - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1529-1544.

Add more citations

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.

View all 19 references / Add more references