Supervenience physicalism: Meeting the demands of determination and explanation

Philosophical Papers 34 (2):189-208 (2005)
Abstract
Abstract Non-reductive physicalism is currently the most widely held metaphysic of mind. My aim in this essay is to show that supervenience physicalism?perhaps the most common form of non-reductive physicalism?is not a defensible position. I argue that, in order for any supervenience thesis to ground a legitimate form of physicalism, it must yield the right sort of determination relation between physical and non-physical properties. Then I argue that non-reductionism leaves one without any explanation for the laws that are implied by supervenience theses that deliver this determination relation
Keywords Determination  Explanation  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Supervenience
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/05568640509485155
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,317
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Essays on Actions and Events.Donald Davidson - 1980 - Oxford University Press.
Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
120 ( #46,014 of 2,223,814 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #140,172 of 2,223,814 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature