Supervenience physicalism: Meeting the demands of determination and explanation

Philosophical Papers 34 (2):189-208 (2005)
Abstract
Abstract Non-reductive physicalism is currently the most widely held metaphysic of mind. My aim in this essay is to show that supervenience physicalism?perhaps the most common form of non-reductive physicalism?is not a defensible position. I argue that, in order for any supervenience thesis to ground a legitimate form of physicalism, it must yield the right sort of determination relation between physical and non-physical properties. Then I argue that non-reductionism leaves one without any explanation for the laws that are implied by supervenience theses that deliver this determination relation
Keywords Determination  Explanation  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Supervenience
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DOI 10.1080/05568640509485155
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Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
Essays on Actions and Events.Donald Davidson - 1980 - Oxford University Press.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.

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