American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):119-129 (2017)

Authors
Georgi Gardiner
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Abstract
An account of the nature of knowledge must explain the value of knowledge. I argue that modal conditions, such as safety and sensitivity, do not confer value on a belief and so any account of knowledge that posits a modal condition as a fundamental constituent cannot vindicate widely held claims about the value of knowledge. I explain the implications of this for epistemology: We must either eschew modal conditions as a fundamental constituent of knowledge, or retain the modal conditions but concede that knowledge is not more valuable than that which falls short of knowledge. This second horn—concluding that knowledge has no distinctive value—is unappealing since it renders puzzling why so much epistemological theorising focuses on knowledge, and why knowledge seems so important.
Keywords safety  swamping problem  epistemic value  Duncan Pritchard  Meno Problem  modal conditions
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.

View all 56 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Luck and Logical Necessities: Armchair Luck Revisited.Guido Melchior - 2017 - In Smiljana Gartner Bojan Borstner (ed.), Thought Experiments between Nature and Society. A Festschrift for Nenad Miščević. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 137-150.
Knowledge and Conditionals of (Dis)Connection.Danilo Šuster - 2015 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):267-294.
Safety and Epistemic Luck.Avram Hiller & Ram Neta - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):303 - 313.
Modal Knowledge and Counterfactual Knowledge.Sonia Roca-Royes - 2011 - Logique Et Analyse 54 (216):537-552.
Knowledge Under Threat.Tomas Bogardus - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):289-313.
Modal Empiricism and Knowledge of De Re Possibilities: A Critique of Roca-Royes' Account.Duško Prelević - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (4):488–498.
Is Safety In Danger?Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):1-19.
The Lottery Puzzle and Pritchard’s Safety Analysis of Knowledge.Mark Mcevoy - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:7-20.
Understanding and Essence.Anand Jayprakash Vaidya - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (4):811-833.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-07-31

Total views
181 ( #59,179 of 2,454,643 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #47,227 of 2,454,643 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes