Theoria 19 (1):31-47 (2004)

Maria Garcia
National Autonomous University of Mexico
Maria Jose Garcia Encinas
University of Granada
Transference theorists propose to explain causation in terms of the transference of a physical element. I argue, in two steps, that this is not possible. First, I show that available accounts of ‘transference’ ultimately convey that transference -and, consequently, causation- is the (non-relational) identity over time of the transferred element (a universal, a trope, or even an absolute substance). But, second, I try to defend, it is conceptually impossible that causation is (non-relational) identity
Keywords causality  transference
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DOI theoria200419127
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References found in this work BETA

Survival and Identity.David K. Lewis - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.
Causation and the Flow of Energy.David Fair - 1979 - Erkenntnis 14 (3):219 - 250.
On the Grammar of 'Cause'.Jerrold L. Aronson - 1971 - Synthese 22 (3-4):414 - 430.

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Tropes for Causation.M. J. Garcia-Encinas - 2009 - Metaphysica 10 (2):157-174.

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