Understanding, Integration, and Epistemic Value

Acta Analytica 27 (2):163-181 (2012)
Authors
Georgi Gardiner
Oxford University
Abstract
Understanding enjoys a special kind of value, one not held by lesser epistemic states such as knowledge and true belief. I explain the value of understanding via a seemingly unrelated topic, the implausibility of veritism. Veritism holds that true belief is the sole ultimate epistemic good and all other epistemic goods derive their value from the epistemic value of true belief. Veritism entails that if you have a true belief that p, you have all the epistemic good qua p. Veritism is a plausible and widely held view; I argue that it is untenable. I argue that integration among beliefs possesses epistemic value independent from the good of true belief, and so has value veritism cannot account for. I argue further that this integration among beliefs comprises the distinctive epistemic value of understanding
Keywords Understanding  Veritism  Epistemic value  Belief  Stroud  Kvanvig
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-012-0152-6
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Value.Wayne D. Riggs - 2009 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Goal of Explanation.Stephen R. Grimm - 2010 - Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 41 (4):337-344.

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The Ethics of Belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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