Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics: A Reply to Two Objections

Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):179-191 (1988)
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This paper has two main purposes: first, to compare Wittgenstein's views to the more traditional views in the philosophy of mathematics; second, to provide a general outline for a Wittgensteinian reply to these two objections. Two fundamental themes of Wittgenstein's account of mathematics title the following two sections: mathematical propositions are rules and not descriptions and mathematics is employed within a form of life. Under each heading, I examine Wittgenstein's rejection of alternative views. My aim is to make clear the differences and too suggest some similarities. As will become soon clear, Wittgenstein often rejects opposing views for the same or similar reasons. This comparison will provide the necessary background for better understanding Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics, for appreciating its many unappreciated advantages and, finally, for defending a conventionalist account of mathematics.



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Pieranna Garavaso
University of Minnesota, Morris

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Book review. [REVIEW]F. J. - 1988 - Philosophia Mathematica (2):87-107.

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