What the History of Vitalism Teaches Us About Consciousness and the "Hard Problem"

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):576-588 (2006)
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Daniel Dennett has claimed that if Chalmers' argument for the irreducibility of consciousness were to succeed, an analogous argument would establish the truth of Vitalism. Chalmers denies that there is such an analogy. I argue that the analogy does have merit and that skepticism is called for



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Brian Jonathan Garrett
Kwantlen Polytechnic University

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Anonymous assertions.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2013 - Episteme 10 (2):135-151.

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