Philosophia 28 (1-4):455-465 (2001)
AbstractIn "Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake?", Howard Wettstein denies that semantics must account for cognitive significance. He thus rejects Frege's condition of adequacy for semantics and rids the new theorists from seemingly intractable puzzles. In a more recent article, Wettstein claims that not only reference but even cognitive significance is not a matter of how the referent is presented to the mind of the speaker. In this paper, I submit that the crucial element in the debate between new theorists and neo-Fregeans concerning the semantic significance of language is the connection between semantic matters and the human thougth.
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Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake?: And Other Essays.Howard WETTSTEIN - 1991 - Stanford University Press.
Turning the Tables on Frege or How is It That "Hesperus is Hesperus" is Trivial?Howard Wettstein - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:317-339.