Why the new theorist may still need to explain cognitive significance but not mind doing it

Philosophia 28 (1-4):455-465 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In "Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake?", Howard Wettstein denies that semantics must account for cognitive significance. He thus rejects Frege's condition of adequacy for semantics and rids the new theorists from seemingly intractable puzzles. In a more recent article, Wettstein claims that not only reference but even cognitive significance is not a matter of how the referent is presented to the mind of the speaker. In this paper, I submit that the crucial element in the debate between new theorists and neo-Fregeans concerning the semantic significance of language is the connection between semantic matters and the human thougth.


Added to PP

192 (#65,124)

6 months
14 (#63,438)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Pieranna Garavaso
University of Minnesota, Morris

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations