Bradley's regress, the copula and the unity of the proposition

Philosophical Quarterly 45 (179):161-180 (1995)
Richard Gaskin
University of Liverpool
If we make the basic assumption that the components of a proposition have reference on the model of proper name and bearer, we face the problem of distinguishing the proposition from a mere list' of names. We neutralize the problem posed by that assumption of we first of all follow Wiggins and distinguish, in every predicate, a strictly predicative element (the copula), and a strictly non-predicative conceptual component (available to be quantified over). If we further allow the copula itself to conform to the basic assumption, a regress ( Bradley's regress') arises: the referent of the copula will be instantiation, the instantiation of instantiation etc. To avert the regress, Wiggins simply legislates that the basic assumption is to fail for the copula. But we are entitled to regard the regress as constitution not a difficulty, but the solution: the infinitism it imports (capturable in a finitistic theory of meaning) is just what the unity of the proposition "is". (edited)
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DOI 10.2307/2220413
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The Concept Horse with No Name.Robert Trueman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1889-1906.
Heidegger the Metaphysician: Modes‐of‐Being and Grundbegriffe.Howard D. Kelly - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):670-693.
Russell and the Unity of the Proposition.Graham Stevens - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):491–506.

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