Reference and the Permutation Argument

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):295-309 (2011)
Abstract
I argue that fidelity to the context principle requires us to construe reference as a theoretical relation. This point helps us understand the bearing of Putnam's permutation argument on the idea of a systematic theory of meaning. Notwithstanding objections that have been made against Putnam's deployment of that argument, it shows the reference relation to be indeterminate. But since the indeterminacy of reference arises from a metalinguistic perspective, our ability, as object-language speakers, to talk about the ordinary features of our lives is unaffected
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00310.x
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References found in this work BETA
Spreading the Word.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Clarendon Press.
Theories and Things.W. V. Quine (ed.) - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Putnam's Paradox.David Lewis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
The Unity of the Proposition.Richard Gaskin - 2008 - Oxford University Press.

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