Virtue and Arguers

Topoi 35 (2):441-450 (2016)

Is a virtue approach in argumentation possible without committing the ad hominem fallacy? My answer is affirmative, provided that the object study of our theory is well delimited. My proposal is that a theory of argumentative virtue should not focus on argument appraisal, as has been assumed, but on those traits that make an individual achieve excellence in argumentative practices. An agent-based approach in argumentation should be developed, not in order to find better grounds for argument appraisal, but to gain insight into argumentative habits and excellence. This way we can benefit from what a virtue argumentation theory really has to offer.
Keywords Arguers  Argumentation  Ad hominem  Virtue
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-015-9321-8
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References found in this work BETA

A Practical Study of Argument.Trudy Govier - 1991 - Wadsworth Pub. Co..
Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation.Douglas Walton - 2005 - Cambridge University Press.
Virtue in Argument.Andrew Aberdein - 2010 - Argumentation 24 (2):165-179.

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Charging Others With Epistemic Vice.Ian James Kidd - 2016 - The Monist 99 (3):181-197.

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