Synthese 198:763-792 (2021)

Bartek Chomanski
Adam Mickiewicz University
Dimitria Gatzia
University of Akron
Berit Brogaard
University of Miami
Integration information theories posit that the integration of information is necessary and/or sufficient for consciousness. In this paper, we focus on three of the most prominent information integration theories: Information Integration Theory, Global Workspace Theory, and Attended Intermediate-Level Theory. We begin by explicating each theory and key concepts they utilize. We then argue that the current evidence indicates that the integration of information is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness. Unlike GWT and AIR, IIT maintains that conscious experience is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness. We present empirical evidence indicating that simple features are experienced in the absence of feature integration and argue that it challenges IIT’s necessity claim. In addition, we challenge IIT’s sufficiency claim by presenting evidence from hemineglect cases and amodal completion indicating that contents may be integrated and yet fail to give rise to subjective experience. Moreover, we present empirical evidence from subjects with frontal lesions who are unable to carry out simple instructions and argue that they are irreconcilable with GWT. Lastly, we argue that empirical evidence indicating that patients with visual agnosia fail to identify objects they report being conscious of present a challenge to AIR’s necessity claim.
Keywords Amodal completion  Attended intermediate-level representation theory  Global workspace theory  Attention  Illusory contours  Information integration theory  Spatial neglect  Visual agnosia  Feature integration  Consciousness
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Reprint years 2020
DOI 10.1007/s11229-020-02613-3
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References found in this work BETA

Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.

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The Functional Contributions of Consciousness.Dylan Ludwig - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 104:103383.

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