Logos and Episteme 5 (3): 265-272 (2014)

Authors
Benoit Gaultier
Université de Neuchâtel
Abstract
In this paper, I propose a new argument against Gettier’s counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. I claim that if there is no doxastic voluntarism, and if it is admitted that one has formed the belief that p at t1 if, at t0, one would be surprised to learn or discover that not–p, it can be plausibly argued that Gettiered beliefs simply cannot be formed.
Keywords belief  evidence  Gettier cases
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ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme2014532
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