A new skeptical solution

Acta Analytica 113 (14):113-129 (1995)

Authors
Christopher Gauker
University of Salzburg
Abstract
Kripke's puzzle about rule-following is a form of the traditional problem of the nature of linguistic meaning. A skeptical solution explains not what meaning is but the role that talk of meaning plays in the linguistic community. Contrary to what some have claimed, the skeptical approach is not self-refuting. However, Kripke's own skeptical solution is inadequate. He has not adequately explained the conditions under which we are justified in attributing meanings or the utility of the practice of attributing meanings. An alternative skeptical solution may be founded on a nonepistemic conception of assertibility. Roughly, a sentence is assertible if it facilitates cooperation. The function of meaning-talk is to resolve certain sorts of conflicts in assertion. Attributions of meaning to persons outside the community may be a proper expression of a practice whose reason for being lies entirely within the community. -/- .
Keywords Epistemology  Language  Meaning  Puzzle  Scepticism  Kripke, S  Wittgenstein
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Yet Another Skeptical Solution.Andrea Guardo - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):117-129.

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