“Jurisdictional Realization of Law” as Judicium: A Methodological Alternative, Beyond Deductive Application and Finalistic Decision

The proposed reflection intends to present the problem of judicial adjudication as a substantially-axiologically founded autonomous moment on the practical realization of law, and to explore this understanding in confrontation with external exigencies, mostly teleologically determined—hence, beyond strict deductive application, as a syllogistic reference of facts to norms, and finalistically determined decision, as an option among possible alternatives to achieve specific aims. The main objective is to enter into a discussion on the methodological meaning of “integrity”, “hard cases” and “right answer”, as presented by Ronald Dworkin, and a critical reflection on the criticism of that approach levelled by Neil MacCormick, so as to confront the relevance of principle and policy arguments, in order to bring about a different methodological approach, an alternative jurisprudentialist conception of adjudication, incorporating a practical-normative constitutive dialectics between legal controversy and legal system, such as that presented by Castanheira Neves. The focus will, then, be the legitimacy of the connection of arguments of principle and consequentialist arguments in adjudication, its selection and its justification, stating, therefore, a specifically assumed judicium, a judicative decision, having the legal system as its horizon of normative reference and of substantial and institutional autonomy.
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DOI 10.1007/s11196-019-09668-7
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Law's Empire.Ronald Dworkin - 1986 - Ethics 97 (4):834-860.
Taking Rights Seriously.R. Dworkin - 1977 - Philosophical Quarterly 27 (109):379-380.

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