T-schema deflationism versus gödel’s first incompleteness theorem

Analysis 61 (2):129–136 (2001)

Christopher Gauker
University of Salzburg
I define T-schema deflationism as the thesis that a theory of truth for our language can simply take the form of certain instances of Tarski's schema (T). I show that any effective enumeration of these instances will yield as a dividend an effective enumeration of all truths of our language. But that contradicts Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem. So the instances of (T) constituting the T-Schema deflationist's theory of truth are not effectively enumerable, which casts doubt on the idea that the T-schema deflationist in any sense has a theory of truth. (The argument in section 2 of "Semantics for Deflationists" supercedes this paper.).
Keywords Gödel Incompleteness  deflationism
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00282
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Deflationism, Conservativeness and Maximality.Cezary Cieśliński - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):695 - 705.
Semantics for Deflationists.Christopher Gauker - 2005 - In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Why the Liar Does Not Matter.Lon Berk - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (3):323-341.
Deflazionismo.Andrea Strollo - 2012 - Aphex 6:on line article..

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