Philosophical Studies 170 (3):563-577 (2014)

Authors
Gerald Gaus
University of Arizona
Abstract
In this issue of Philosophical Studies, Richard Arneson, Jonathan Quong and Robert Talisse contribute papers discussing The Order of Public Reason (OPR). All press what I call “agent-type challenges” to the project of OPR. In different ways they all focus on a type (or types) of moral (or sometimes not-so-moral) agent. Arneson presents a good person who is so concerned with doing the best thing she does not truly endorse social morality; Quong a bad person who rejects it and violates the basic rights of others, and Talisse a morally ugly person, a hypocrite, who criticizes others for failing to do what he does not do. All suggest that OPR does not give a satisfying account of what we are to say to, or how we should act towards, such agents. In my response I highlight some core concerns of OPR, while also seeking to show that OPR does not say quite what they think it says, and it often leaves them room for saying what they would like to say about such agents
Keywords Order of public reason  Social morality  Moral authority  Moral theory
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0269-5
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References found in this work BETA

Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition.John Rawls - 2005 - Columbia University Press.
The Theory of Moral Sentiments.Adam Smith - 1759 - Dover Publications.

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Citations of this work BETA

Justification, Coercion, and the Place of Public Reason.Chad Van Schoelandt - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1031-1050.
Public Reason and Reliability Democracy.Elvio Baccarini - 2020 - Filozofija I Društvo 31 (1):12-23.
On Theorizing About Public Reason.Gerald Gaus - 2013 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (1):64-85.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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