The Lockean theory of communication

Noûs 26 (3):303-324 (1992)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The Lockean theory of communication is here defined as the theory that communication takes place when a hearer grasps some sort of mental object, distinct from the speaker's words, that the speaker's words express. This theory contrasts with the view that spoken languages are the very medium of a kind of thought of which overt speech is the most basic form. This article is a critique of some of the most common motives for adopting a Lockean theory of communication. It is not enough that words in some sense express thoughts. It is not enough that animals and prelinguistic infants in some sense think. It is not enough that speakers mean something by what they say or that hearers must understand a speaker's presuppositions. On the contrary, any explanation of how children can learn to communicate in the way the Lockean imagines will presuppose that words can instill beliefs in some way more fundamental than the Lockean theory itself can explain.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 107,099

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Speaker's meaning.Frank Vlach - 1980 - Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (3):359 - 391.
The Lockean Enough-and-as-Good Proviso: An Internal Critique.Helga Varden - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (3):410-442.
Language.[author unknown] - 1998 - In Vere Claiborne Chappell, Locke. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 133-151.
As Good As ‘Enough and As Good’.Bas van der Vossen - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):183-203.
Speaker meaning, utterance meaning and radical interpretation in Davidson’s ‘A nice derangement of epitaphs’.Imogen Smith - 2017 - Empedocles European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication 8 (2):205-219.
Self-ownership and the Lockean proviso.Tibor R. Machan - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (1):93-98.
Is there synonymy in Ockham's mental language.David J. Chalmers - 1999 - In Paul Vincent Spade, The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 76.
Property Rights: A Lockean-Christian View.Paul Kong - 1989 - Dissertation, Vanderbilt University

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
192 (#136,399)

6 months
4 (#1,135,179)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christopher Gauker
University of Salzburg

Citations of this work

I don't think so: Pinker on the mentalese monopoly.David J. Cole - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (3):283-295.
Utterance content, speaker’s intentions and linguistic liability.Claudia Picazo Jaque - 2017 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 32 (3):329.
Revealing the language of thought.Brent Silby - 2024 - Christchurch: Amazon.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references