Phenomenal Characters of Mental States and Emerging Issues in African Philosophy of Mind

Abstract
There is a prevalent assumption that the phenomenal character of a mental experience is an ontological property existing as part of the fabric of the world. This implies that the problem of explaining the phenomenal property of a mental experience is a metaphysical one. Contrary to this assumption, the present paper argues that phenomenal properties of mental experiences are the results of our epistemological perspectives of the world. Consequently, the paper contends that in developing issues for African Philosophy of Mind, care must, ab initio, be taken to avoid the metaphysical pitfalls of considering phenomenal characters or properties of mental states to be part of the fabric of the world
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  Social and Political Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 2076-7714
DOI 10.4314/tp.v3i1.70988
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