Towards a Neuroidentity Theory of Qualia

Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy (Philippine e-journal) 15 (1):40-49 (2014)
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Abstract

Arguments against the plausibility of a scientific theory of consciousness are hinged on the ground that attached to mental consciousness are phenomenal properties, also known as qualia, which are not amenable to any scientific theory. This paper develops and defends a neuroidentity hypothesis that purports to show that qualia, which are identified as neuroqualia, are the same as some neurochemical interactions in the central nervous system. The neuroidentity hypothesis is offered as a possible way of moving closer to a probable scientific theory of consciousness.

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