Philosophy of Science 83 (5):934-945 (2016)

Authors
Gerhard Schurz
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf
Alexander Gebharter
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Abstract
Mechanisms play an important role in many sciences when it comes to questions concerning explanation, prediction, and control. Answering such questions in a quantitative way requires a formal represention of mechanisms. Gebharter (2014) suggests to represent mechanisms by means of one or more causal arrows of an acyclic causal net. In this paper we show how this approach can be extended in such a way that it can also be fruitfully applied to mechanisms featuring causal feedback.
Keywords mechanisms  causation  causal models  causal cycles  causal feedback
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1086/687876
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References found in this work BETA

A Formal Framework for Representing Mechanisms?Alexander Gebharter - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):138-153.
Another Problem with RBN Models of Mechanisms.Alexander Gebharter - 2016 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 31 (2):177-188.

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Citations of this work BETA

Saving the Mutual Manipulability Account of Constitutive Relevance.Beate Krickel - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 68:58-67.

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