Erkenntnis:1-18 (forthcoming)

Authors
Alexander Gebharter
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Maria Sekatskaya
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf
Gerhard Schurz
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf
Abstract
Strong notions of free will are closely connected to the possibility to do otherwise as well as to an agent's ability to causally influence her environment via her decisions controlling her actions. In this paper we employ techniques from the causal modeling literature to investigate whether a notion of free will subscribing to one or both of these requirements is compatible with naturalistic views of the world such as non-reductive physicalism to the background of determinism and indeterminism. We argue that from a causal modeler’s perspective the only possibility to get both requirements consists in subscribing to reductive physicalism and indeterminism.
Keywords free will  causal modeling  causation  possibility to do otherwise  control  physicalism  determinism  reductionism
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-020-00281-w
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References found in this work BETA

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.

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