Authors
Alexander Gebharter
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Abstract
Supporters of the autonomy of higher-level causation (or explanation) often appeal to proportionality, arguing that higher-level causes are more proportional than their lower-level realizers. Recently, measures based on information theory and causal modeling have been proposed that allow one to shed new light on proportionality and the related notion of specificity. In this paper we apply ideas from this literature to the issue of higher vs. lower-level causation (and explanation). Surprisingly, proportionality turns out to be irrelevant for the question of whether higher-level causes (or explanations) can be autonomous; specificity is a much more informative notion for this purpose.
Keywords causation  proportionality  explanation  specificity  causal modeling  information theory  causal Bayesian networks  levels  mental causation  supervenience
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/714818
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,247
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Experiment, Downward Causation, and Interventionist Levels of Explanation.Veli-Pekka Parkkinen - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (3):245-261.
Interventionism and Higher-Level Causation.Vera Hoffman-Kolss - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (1):49-64.
Proportionality, Contrast and Explanation.Brad Weslake - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):785-797.
Mental Causation and the Causal Completeness of Physics.Wilson Mendonça - 2002 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 6 (1):121-132.
Causal Exclusion and the Limits of Proportionality.Neil McDonnell - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1459-1474.
Abstract Versus Causal Explanations?Reutlinger Alexander & Andersen Holly - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (2):129-146.
Supervenience and Explanation.Harold Kincaid - 1988 - Synthese 77 (November):251-81.
Supervenient Causation and Programme Explanation.Tamas Demeter - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):83-93.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-09-14

Total views
37 ( #291,023 of 2,448,492 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #44,477 of 2,448,492 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes