Moral twin-earth and semantic moral realism

Erkenntnis 62 (3):353-378 (2005)
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Abstract

Mark Timmons and Terry Horgan have argued that the new moral realism, which rests on the causal theory of reference, is untenable. While I do agree that the new moral realism is untenable, I do not think that Timmons and Horgan have succeeded in showing that it is. I will lay out the case for new moral realism and Horgan and Timmons’ argument against it, and then argue that their argument fails. Further, I will discuss Boyd’s semantic theory as well as attempts to improve upon it, raise serious problems for these semantic accounts, and suggest an alternative view that accounts for our use of moral terms.

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Heimir Geirsson
Iowa State University

Citations of this work

The Eligibility of Ethical Naturalism.Douglas Edwards - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):1-18.
Moral Twin Earth, Intuitions, and Kind Terms.Heimir Geirsson - 2014 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):91-110.

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References found in this work

“How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.

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