Necessity, Apriority, and True Identity Statements

Erkenntnis 40 (2):227 - 242 (1994)
Abstract
The thesis that the necessary and the a priori are extensionally equivalent consists of two independent claims: 1) All a priori truths are necessary and 2) all necessary truths are a priori. In Naming and Necessity1 Saul A. Kripke gives examples of necessary but a posteriori truths, so he disagrees with the second leg of the thesis.2 His examples are of two types; on the one hand statements involving essential properties and on the other hand true identity statements. My concern will be with examples of the second type and whether they refute (2). (2), however, is ambiguous and can mean one of three things.
Keywords necessary  a priori  identity statements  extension equivalence
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DOI 10.1007/BF01128594
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Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Clarendon Press.
A Puzzle About Belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.

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