Rational Feelings and Moral Agency

Kantian Review 16 (2):283-308 (2011)
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Abstract

Kant's conception of moral agency is often charged with attributing no role to feelings. I suggest that respect is the effective force driving moral action. I then argue that four additional types of rational feelings are necessary conditions of moral agency: The affective inner life of moral agents deliberating how to act and reflecting on their deeds is rich and complex . To act morally we must turn our affective moral perception towards the ends of moral action: the welfare of others ; and our own moral being . Feelings shape our particular moral acts . I tentatively suggest that the diversity of moral feelings might be as great as the range of our duties

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Ido Geiger
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Citations of this work

Kant on Moral Feeling and Practical Judgment.Nicholas Dunn - 2024 - In Edgar Valdez (ed.), Rethinking Kant Volume 7. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 72-96.
Kant on Moral Sensibility and Moral Motivation.Owen Ware - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (4):727-746.
Kant on moral self‐opacity.Anastasia N. A. Berg - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):567-585.

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References found in this work

Kant’s Ethical Thought.Allen W. Wood - 1999 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kant's Theory of Freedom.Henry E. Allison - 1990 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kantian ethics almost without apology.Marcia Baron - 1995 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
A commentary on Kant's Critique of practical reason.Lewis White Beck - 1960 - [Chicago]: University of Chicago Press.

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