Appearance and Illusion

Mind 123 (490):339-376 (2014)
Authors
James Genone
Rutgers University - Camden
Abstract
Recent debates between representational and relational theories of perceptual experience sometimes fail to clarify in what respect the two views differ. In this essay, I explain that the relational view rejects two related claims endorsed by most representationalists: the claim that perceptual experiences can be erroneous, and the claim that having the same representational content is what explains the indiscriminability of veridical perceptions and phenomenally matching illusions or hallucinations. I then show how the relational view can claim that errors associated with perception should be explained in terms of false judgments, and develop a theory of illusions based on the idea that appearances are properties of objects in the surrounding environment. I provide an account of why appearances are sometimes misleading, and conclude by showing how the availability of this view undermines one of the most common ways of motivating representationalist theories of perception
Keywords Perceptual Experience  Representationalism  The Relational View of Perception  Appearance Properties  Direct Realism  Naive Realism  Illusion  Perceptual Content
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Reprint years 2014
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzu056
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References found in this work BETA

The Silence of the Senses.Charles S. Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.
Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
Experience and Content.Alex Byrne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.
What Are the Contents of Experiences?Adam Pautz - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):483-507.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Perceptual Particularity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):25-54.
In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.
Kant on Perceptual Content.Colin McLear - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):95-144.
The Epistemic Significance of Experience.Alex Byrne - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173:947-67.

View all 20 citations / Add more citations

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