A Threefold Defense of Perceptual Dogmatism

Undergraduate Honors Theses (2017)

Hunter R. Gentry
University of Houston
This paper attempts to defend perceptual dogmatism (PD), a theory of epistemic justification, from three objections: (1) the subject's perspective objection (SPO), (2) the problem of easy justification, and (3) the objection from cognitive penetration. The SPO charges PD with allowing for a subject to be justified in his belief that P even when P is accidentally true from the subject's perspective. The problem of easy justification claims that intuitively, PD is too permissive in granting justification for beliefs about the external world, such that a subject can come to have justification for the reliability of his/her perceptual faculties by trivial entailment and/or bootstrapping. The objector claims that the reasoning from the belief about the external world to the belief about reliability is sound, but the justification was arrived at too easily. The objection from cognitive penetration claims that prior mental states can cause a subject to have certain perceptual experiences. If perceptual experiences are supposed to be justification conferring, then there ought to be constraints on the etiology of the experience because inappropriate mental states can cause experiences that intuitively are not justification conferring. I offer some arguments guarding against these objections.
Keywords Dogmatism  Justification  Perception  Cognitive Penetration  Evidence  Subject's Perspective Objection
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.

View all 40 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Real Epistemic Problem of Cognitive Penetration.Harmen Ghijsen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1457-1475.
¿Qué está mal con el dogmatismo de Pryor?Jorge Ornelas Bernal & G. Cíntora - 2014 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 26 (1):7-31.
Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.
Unconscious Perceptual Justification.Jacob Berger, Bence Nanay & Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):569-589.
How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism.Paul Silva - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.
In Defence of Dogmatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):261-282.
Cognitive Penetration, Imagining, and the Downgrade Thesis.Lu Teng - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):405-426.
Pryor's Dogmatism Against The Skeptic.Eunjin Lee - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:155-161.


Added to PP index

Total views
109 ( #65,036 of 2,328,173 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
55 ( #9,163 of 2,328,173 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature