Authors
Abstract
Compared to other animals, humans appear to have a special motivation to share experiences and mental states with others, which enables them to enter a condition of ‘we’ or shared intentionality. Shared intentionality has been suggested to be an evolutionary response to unique problems faced in complex joint action coordination and to be unique to humans. The theoretical and empirical bases for this claim, however, present several issues and inconsistencies. Here, we suggest that shared intentionality can be approached as an interactional achievement, and that by studying how our closest relatives, the great apes, coordinate joint action with conspecifics, we might demonstrate some correlate abilities of shared intentionality, such as the appreciation of joint commitment. We provide seven examples from bonobo joint activities to illustrate our framework.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1075/is.18048.gen
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,159
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind? 30 Years Later.Josep Call & Michael Tomasello - 2008 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (5):187-192.
Toward a Mechanistic Psychology of Dialogue.Martin J. Pickering & Simon Garrod - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):169-190.
Shared Intention.Michael Bratman - 1993 - Ethics 104 (1):97-113.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Joint Intentionality: From Thin to Thick.Koreň Ladislav - 2016 - Journal of Social Ontology 2 (1):75-85.
Joint Attention in Apes and Humans: Are Humans Unique?David Leavens & Timothy Racine - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):240-267.
Joint Action and Development.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):23-47.
Just How Joint Is Joint Action in Infancy?Malinda Carpenter - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):380-392.
Joint Attention in Joint Action.Anika Fiebich & Shaun Gallagher - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):571-87.
The Epistemic Core of Weak Joint Action.Cedric Paternotte - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (1):1-24.
Let’s Pretend!: Children and Joint Action.Deborah Tollefsen - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):75-97.
Naturalizing Joint Action: A Process-Based Approach.Deborah Tollefsen & Rick Dale - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):385-407.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-11-10

Total views
44 ( #245,170 of 2,454,913 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #179,303 of 2,454,913 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes