Leibniz on consciousness and self-consciousness

In Chalres Huenemann & Rocco J. Gennaro (eds.), New Essays on the Rationalists. Oxford University Press. pp. 353--71 (1999)
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Abstract

In the absence of any plausible reductionist account of consciousness in nonmentalistic terms, the HOT theory says that the best explanation for what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by a thought (or awareness) that one is in that state. I discuss HOT theory with special attention to how Leibnizian theses can help support it and how it can shed light on Leibniz's theory of perception, apperception, and consciousness. It will become clear how treating Leibniz as a HOT theorist can solve some of the problems he faced and some of the puzzles posed by commentators, e.g. animal mentality and the role of reason and memory in self-consciousness.

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Author's Profile

Rocco J. Gennaro
University of Southern Indiana

Citations of this work

Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT Theory of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):293-330.
Seventeenth-century theories of consciousness.Larry M. Jorgensen - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Leibniz on Memory and Consciousness.Larry M. Jorgensen - 2011 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (5):887-916.
Spinoza and the problem of other substances.Galen Barry - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):481-507.
What is the Structure of Self-Consciousness and Conscious Mental States?Rocco J. Gennaro - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):295-309.

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Two concepts of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Kant's Analytic.Jonathan Bennett - 1968 - Philosophy 43 (165):295-298.

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