Oxford Studies in Epistemology

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Oxford University Press (2005)
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Abstract

Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial publicaton which offers a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field.

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2010

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9780199237067   0199584087   0199237069   0199285896   9780199584086   0199672709

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edition Gendler, Tamar Szabó; Hawthorne, John; Chung, Julianne (2022) "Oxford Studies in Epistemology 7". Oxford University Press

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Chapters

Abductive Knowledge and Holmesian Inference.Alexander Bird
Accuracy and Educated Guesses.Sophie Horowitz
Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?Susanna Siegel
Clarifying Pragmatic Encroachment: A Reply to Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne on Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes.Jeremy Fanti & Matthew McGrath
Confidence and Coarse-Grained Attitudes.Scott Sturgeon
Contrastive Knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer
Doubt, Deference, and Deliberation: Understanding and Using the Division of Cognitive Labour.Frank Keil
Evidence and Epistemic Evaluation.Jessica Brown
Expressivism, Normative Uncertainty, and Arguments for Probabilism.Julia Staffel
How Much is at Stake for the Pragmatic Encroacher.Jeffrey Sanford Russell
How Much is at Stake for the Pragmatic Encroacher.Jeffery Sanford Russell
Knowledge Is Belief For Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason.Mark Schroeder
Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes.Charity Anderson & John Hawthorne
Modal Empiricism: What is the Problem.Albert Casullo
New Rational Reflection and Internalism about Rationality.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
New rational reflection and internalism about rationality.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
Note on Gibbard, ‘rational credence and the value of truth’.Eric Swanson
On the Accuracy of Group Credences.Richard Pettigrew
Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects.Kit Fine
Paradox and the A Priori.Stephen Schiffer
Putting a Value on Beauty.Rachael Briggs
Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum
Rationality’s fixed point.Michael Titelbaum
Recent Debates about the A Priori.Harty Field
Seeing What You're Doing.John Gibbons
Seeing What You're Doing.John Gibbons
Selective Trust in Testimony: Children's Evaluation of the Message, the Speaker and the Speech Act.Melissa Koenig
Sleeping Beauty Reconsidered: Conditioning and Reflection in Asynchronous Systems.Joseph Halpern
Space, Structuralism, and Skepticism.Jonathan Vogel
Stakes, Practical Adequacy, and the Epistemic Significance of Double-Checking.Sanford C. Goldberg
Subjective Probability and the Content/Attitude Distinction.Jennifer Rose Carr
The Art of Learning.Jason Konek
The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.John MacFarlane
The Fallacy of Epistemicism.James Cargile
The aggregation of propositional attitudes: Towards a general theory.Franz Dietrich & Christian List
There Are No Rational Pairs of Contradictory Beliefs.Jonathan Sutton
Unravelling the Tangled Web: Continuity, Internalism, Uniqueness and Self-Locating Belief.Chris Meacham
When Beauties Disagree: Why Halfers Should Affirm Robust Perspectivalism.John Pittard
Who Wants to Know?Jennifer Nado
Why Philosophy Can Overturn Common Sense 1.Susanna Rinard
1. The Epistemology of Conditionals.  (pages 1)Igor Douven
Abductive Knowledge and Holmesian Inference.  (pages 1--31)Alexander Bird
Abductive knowledge and Holmesian inference.  (pages 1--31)Alexander Bird
Grasping the Third Realm.  (pages 1-38)John Bengson
Paradox and the A Priori.  (pages 1--273)Stephen Schiffer
1. a credal approach to coarse attitudes.  (pages 3--126)Scott Sturgeon
10. Can There Be Institutional Virtues?  (pages 3--235)Miranda Fricker
6. There Are No Rational Pairs of Contradictory Beliefs (Whatever Some Philosophers of Language Say).  (pages 3--150)Jonathan Sutton
Confidence and coarse-grained attitudes.  (pages 3--126)Scott Sturgeon
Does Murphy’s law apply in epistemology? Self-doubt and rational ideals.  (pages 3–21)David Christensen
Does murphy’s law apply in epistemology?  (pages 3-31)David Christensen
Selective trust in testimony: Children's evaluation of the message, the speaker, and the speech act.  (pages 3--253)Melissa A. Koenig
The project.  (pages 3--35)Troy Cross
An Opinionated Guide to Epistemic Modality.  (pages 32-62)Kai von Fintel & Anthony Gillies
The Fallacy of Epistemicism.  (pages 33)James Cargile
A Defense of Dogmatism.  (pages 34-57)Jeremy Fantl
Skeptical Success.  (pages 35-62)Troy Cross
Content Focused Epistemic Injustice.  (pages 48-70)Robin Dembroff & Dennis Whitcomb
Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief.  (pages 57)Jane Friedman
Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence.  (pages 61-96)Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran
Epistemic Conservatism: Theft or Honest Toil?  (pages 63-86)Richard Fumerton
4. Probability and Prodigality.  (pages 82)Daniel Greco
The Evolution of Irrationality: Insights from Non-human Primates.  (pages 87-107)Laurie Santos
Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects.  (pages 89-109)Kit Fine
Our knowledge of mathematical objects.  (pages 89-109)Kit Fine
Fallibilism and Multiple Paths to Knowledge.  (pages 97-144)Wesley H. Holliday
Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic.  (pages 108-142)Nico Silins
Essence and natural kinds: When science meets preschooler intuition.  (pages 108-66)Sarah-Jane Leslie
Sleeping Beauty reconsidered.  (pages 111--142)Joseph Halpern
Doubt, Deference, and Deliberation: Understanding and Using the Division of Cognitive Labour.  (pages 143)Frank Keil
Rational Credence and the Value of Truth.  (pages 143-164)Allan Gibbard
1. evidential symmetry let's say that propositions P and Q are evidentially symmetrical (I'll write this asp & q) for a subject if his evidence no more supports one than the other. I mean to understand evidence very broadly here to encompass whatever we have.  (pages 161)Sarah Moss Kotzen, James Overton, Agustin Rayo, Susanna Rinard, Teddy Seidenfeld, Mike Smithson, Scott Sturgeon, Elliott Sober & Bas van Fraassen
Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.  (pages 161-186)Roger White
Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.  (pages 161-186)Roger White
Rationality and Self-Confidence.  (pages 165-178)Frank Arntzenius
6. Easy Knowledge, Transmission Failure, and Empiricism.  (pages 166)Ram Neta
Time-Slice Epistemology and Action Under Indeterminacy.  (pages 172--94)Sarah Moss
Time-slice epistemology and action under indeterminacy.  (pages 172–94)Sarah Moss
Time–Slice Epistemology and Action under Indeterminacy.  (pages 172--94)Sarah Moss
Systems-oriented social epistemology.  (pages 189-214)Alvin I. Goldman
Aiming at Truth over Time: Reply to Arntzenius and Swanson.  (pages 190-204)Allan Gibbard
The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.  (pages 197--234)John MacFarlane
What to believe about your belief that you're in the good case.  (pages 206-233)Alex Worsnip
Could Evolution Explain Our Reliability about Logic.  (pages 214)Joshua Schechter
Trust as an unquestioning attitude.  (pages 214-244)C. Thi Nguyen
Can There Be Institutional Virtues?  (pages 235-252)Miranda Fricker
Contrastive knowledge.  (pages 235)Jonathan Schaffer
What should we do when we disagree?  (pages 274-93)Jennifer Lackey
Knowledge as a Mental State.  (pages 275-310)Jennifer Nagel
An Inferentialist Conception of the A Priori.  (pages 295–314)Ralph Wedgwood
11. What Does Knowledge Explain? Commentary on Jennifer Nagel,'Knowledge as a Mental State'.  (pages 309)Stephen A. Butterfill
Scepticism, Rationalism, and Externalism.  (pages 311-331)Brian Weatherson
12. Knowledge, Causal Explanation, and Teleology.  (pages 321)Iohannes Roessler
13. Is Knowledge a Non-Composite Mental State?  (pages 333-343)Patrick Rysiew

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Author Profiles

John Hawthorne
University of Southern California
Tamar Gendler
Yale University

Citations of this work

The ethics of belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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