Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):34-54 (2002)

Authors
Tamar Gendler
Yale University
Abstract
Through careful analysis of a specific example, Parfit’s ‘fission argument’ for the unimportance of personal identity, I argue that our judgements concerning imaginary scenarios are likely to be unreliable when the scenarios involve disruptions of certain contingent correlations. Parfit’s argument depends on our hypothesizing away a number of facts which play a central role in our understanding and employment of the very concept under investigation; as a result, it fails to establish what Parfit claims, namely, that identity is not what matters. I argue that Parfit’s conclusion can be blocked without denying that he has presented an imaginary case where prudential concern would be rational in the absence of identity. My analysis depends on the recognition that the features that explain or justify a relation may be distinct from the features that underpin it as necessary conditions.
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00251
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Love as a Moral Emotion.J. David Velleman - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):338-374.
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The Limits of Self-Awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
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Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
Object Persistence in Philosophy and Psychology.Brian J. Scholl - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (5):563–591.

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