Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (2):276-294 (1997)
This paper examines and discusses an argument for the collapse of modal distincions offered by Quine in "Reference and Modality" and in Word and Object that relies exclusively on a version of the Principle of Substitution. It is argued that the argument does not affect its historical targets: Carnap's treatment of modality, presented in Meaning and Necessity, and Church's Logic of Sense and Denotation, developed by Kaplan; nor does it affect a treatment of modality inspired in Frege's treatment of oblique contexts. It is argued, nevertheless, that the immunity of those systems to Quine's argument depends on the success of their rejection of the Principle of Substitution presupposed by Quine
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Marti on Descriptions in Carnap's S.Michael Kremer - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (6):629-634.
Do Modal Distinctions Collapse in Carnap's System?Genoveva Marti - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (6):575 - 593.
Three Grades of Probabilistic Involvement.Howard Smokler - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 32 (2):129 - 142.
The Collapse of Modal Distinctions in Probabilistic Contexts.Howard Smokler - 1979 - Theoria 45 (1):1-7.
Modal Collapse in Gödel's Ontological Proof.Srećko Kovač - 2012 - In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), Ontological Proofs Today. Ontos Verlag. pp. 50--323.
Modal Realism with Modal Tense 1.Takashi Yagisawa - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):309-327.
Quine's Weak and Strong Indispensability Argument.Lieven Decock - 2002 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 33 (2):231-250.
Quine, Putnam, and the 'Quine-Putnam' Indispensability Argument.David Liggins - 2007 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):113 - 127.
Avicenna and Ūsī on Modal Logic.Henrik Lagerlund - 2009 - History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (3):227-239.
The Unavailability of What We Mean: A Reply to Quine, Fodor and Lepore.Georges Rey - 1993 - In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Amsterdam: Rodopi. pp. 61-101.
The Modal Ontological Argument Meets Modal Fictionalism.T. Parent - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):338-352.
Added to index2010-08-24
Total downloads19 ( #258,567 of 2,169,086 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #186,456 of 2,169,086 )
How can I increase my downloads?