On washing the fur without wetting it: Quine, Carnap, and analyticity

Mind 109 (433):1-24 (2000)

Alexander George
Amherst College
Despite its centrality and its familiarity, W. V. Quine's dispute with Rudolf Carnap over the analytic/synthetic distinction has lacked a satisfactory analysis. The impasse is usually explained either by judging that Quine's arguments are in reality quite weak, or by concluding instead that Carnap was incapable of appreciating their strength. This is unsatisfactory, as is the fact that on these readings it is usually unclear why Quine's own position is not subject to some of the very same arguments. A satisfying and surprising account is here presented that stiches together the puzzling pieces of this important philosophical exchange and that in turn leads to an explanation of why it is so difficult to say whether anything of substance is at stake.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/109.433.1
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 40,715
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Carnap and Quine on Truth by Convention.G. Ebbs - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):193-237.
Quine Against Lewis on Truth by Convention.Sean Morris - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Artificial Language Philosophy of Science.Sebastian Lutz - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):181–203.
Opening the Door to Cloud-Cuckoo-Land: Hempel and Kuhn on Rationality.Alexander George - 2012 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (4).

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Quine, Analyticity and Philosophy of Mathematics.John P. Burgess - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):38–55.
Every Dogma has its Day.Richard Creath - 1991 - Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):347-389.
Putting the Bite Back Into 'Two Dogmas'.Paul Gregory - 2003 - Principia 7 (1-2):115-129.
‘Two Dogmas’ -- All Bark and No Bite?Paul A. Gregory - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):633–648.
Empirical Equivalence in the Quine-Carnap Debate.Eric J. Loomis - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):499–508.
On the Quinean-Analyticity of Mathematical Propositions.Gregory Lavers - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):299-319.


Added to PP index

Total views
284 ( #19,174 of 2,243,719 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #320,280 of 2,243,719 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature