Propositions, representation, and truth

Synthese 196 (3):1019-1043 (2019)

Authors
Geoff Georgi
West Virginia University
Abstract
Theories of propositions as sets of truth-supporting circumstances are committed to the thesis that sentences or other representations true in all and only the same circumstances express the same proposition. Theories of propositions as complex, structured entities are not committed to this thesis. As a result, structured propositions can play a role in our theories of language and thought that sets of truth-supporting circumstances cannot play. To illustrate this difference, I sketch a theory of transparent, non-deflationary truth consistent with some theories of structured propositions, but inconsistent with any theory of propositions as sets of truth-supporting circumstances.
Keywords Possible worlds  Propositions  Fineness of grain  Truth
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-017-1492-y
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
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Spandrels of Truth.Jc Beall - 2010 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16 (2):284-286.

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