A defense of the knowledge argument

Philosophical Studies 93 (3):317-336 (1999)
This paper calls into question the viability of materialist reduction of the phenomenal. I revisit the 'Knowledge Argument', which claims that there is information about the phenomenal which is not reducible to, nor even inferable from, information about the physical. I demonstrate the failure of the two chief strategies for blocking the Knowledge Argument: analyzing phenomenal knowledge as an ability, and construing it as knowledge of facts which are ontologically reducible to physical facts. Materialist reduction of the phenomenal is, thus, untenable; materialists must adopt a more extreme, eliminativist view about the phenomenal
Keywords Ability  Knowledge  Materialism  Metaphysics  Mind  Conee, E  Lewis, D  Tye, M
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1004216101557
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Introspecting Phenomenal States.Brie Gertler - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):305-28.
The Knowledge Argument and Objectivity.Robert J. Howell - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):145-177.
Enlightening the Fully Informed.Michael W. Pelczar - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (1):29-56.
Imagining, Recognizing and Discriminating: Reconsidering the Ability Hypothesis.Bence Nanay - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):699-717.

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