A puzzle about mental self-representation and causation

Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):890-906 (2014)
Authors
Mikkel Gerken
University of Southern Denmark
Abstract
The paper articulates a puzzle that consists in the prima facie incompatibility between three widely accepted theses. The first thesis is, roughly, that there are intrinsically selfrepresentational thoughts. The second thesis is, roughly, that there is a particular causal constraint on mental representation. The third thesis is, roughly, that nothing causes itself. In this paper, the theses are articulated in a less rough manner with the occurrence of the puzzle as a result. Finally, a number of solution strategies are considered, and a preliminary diagnosis is provided.
Keywords mental representation  causation  self-representation  naturalism
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2013.775642
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References found in this work BETA

Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Demonstratives.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.

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