Avoiding the conditional fallacy

Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):88-95 (2002)
Abstract
Over-simple internalist accounts of practical reasons imply that we cannot have reasons to become more rational, because they claim that we have a reason to φ only if we would have some desire to φ if we were fully rational. But if we were fully rational, we would have no desire to become more rational. Robert Johnson has recently argued that in their attempts to avoid this problem, existing versions of internalism yield reasons which do not have an appropriate connection with potential explanations of action. I suggest that the problem is partly a result of failure to see that action-tokens are usually tokens of a wide variety of action-types, and that the internalist conditional need only be true of one of these types in order to justify a reason claim about the token
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00255
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,334
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50 (226):115 - 151.
Internal Reasons.Michael Smith - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):109-131.
Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy.Robert N. Johnson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (194):53-71.
The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy.Robert K. Shope - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (8):397-413.
Motivational Internalism: A Somewhat Less Idealized Acount.Mark Roojen - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):233-241.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Conditional Desirability.Richard Bradley - 1999 - Theory and Decision 47 (1):23-55.
Reasons, Values, and Rational Actions.Paul K. Moser - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:127-151.
Internal Reasons: Reply to Brady, Van Roojen and Gert.Robert N. Johnson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):573–580.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
56 ( #104,587 of 2,225,156 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #181,126 of 2,225,156 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature