Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):88-95 (2002)
Over-simple internalist accounts of practical reasons imply that we cannot have reasons to become more rational, because they claim that we have a reason to φ only if we would have some desire to φ if we were fully rational. But if we were fully rational, we would have no desire to become more rational. Robert Johnson has recently argued that in their attempts to avoid this problem, existing versions of internalism yield reasons which do not have an appropriate connection with potential explanations of action. I suggest that the problem is partly a result of failure to see that action-tokens are usually tokens of a wide variety of action-types, and that the internalist conditional need only be true of one of these types in order to justify a reason claim about the token
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50 (226):115 - 151.
Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy.Robert N. Johnson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (194):53-71.
The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy.Robert K. Shope - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (8):397-413.
Autonomy and Deontology.Thomas Nagel - 1988 - In Samuel Scheffler (ed.), Consequentialism and its Critics. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
The Indeterminacy of Desire and Practical Reason.Patrick Fleming - forthcoming - In David K. Chan (ed.), Moral Psychology Today: Essays on Values, Rational Choice, and the Will. Springer: Philosophical Studies Series.
Reasons, Values, and Rational Actions.Paul K. Moser - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:127-151.
Internal Reasons: Reply to Brady, Van Roojen and Gert.Robert N. Johnson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):573–580.
Rational Action Entails Rational Desire: A Critical Review of Searle's Rationality in Action.Amy Peikoff - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):124 – 138.
Antirealism and the Conditional Fallacy: The Semantic Approach.Patrick Girard & Luca Moretti - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):761-783.
Internalism, (Super)Fragile Reasons, and the Conditional Fallacy.Teresa Robertson - 2003 - Philosophical Papers 32 (2):171-184.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads52 ( #100,603 of 2,170,061 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #345,514 of 2,170,061 )
How can I increase my downloads?