Erkenntnis 62 (3):295-319 (2005)

Authors
Joshua Gert
College of William and Mary
Abstract
This paper offers one formal reason why it may often be inappropriate to hold, of two conflicting desires, that the first must be weaker than, stronger than, or of the same strength as the second. The explanation of this fact does not rely on vagueness or epistemological problems in determining the strengths of desires. Nor does it make use of the problematic notion of incommensurability. Rather, the suggestion is that the motivational capacities of many desires might best be characterized by two values, neither of which should be interpreted as strength.
Keywords Desire  Metaphysics  Motivation  Strength  Value
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-004-6881-1
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References found in this work BETA

The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Motivation and Agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Color Realism and Color Science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.

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Citations of this work BETA

Desire.Timothy Schroeder - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 (6):631-639.
Are There Passive Desires?David Wall - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (2):133-155.

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